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ABSTRACT
Whether or not there can be occasions on which judgments of 
responsibility for another's misfortune reflect an observer's 
self-protective motives has, for a long time, been an area of 
controversy between "rational" and "motivational" attribution 
paradigms. So far, attribution theorists have found evidence for 
two self-protective motives that influence a perceiver1s 
responsibility judgments, namely a need to believe in a just world 
and Shaver's (1970) relevance-dependent model of defensive 
attribution. Although there is evidence to support both the just 
world and defensive hypotheses, the present study considered only 
the latter. Despite the evidence, however, the rationalists 
insist that findings are inconsistent and confusing, criticizing 
the research on both conceptual and methodological grounds 
(Tetlock & Levi, 1982). Responding to these criticisms was the 
major thrust of the present study.
Attention was paid specifically to (a) clearing up any 
conceptual confusion, (b) disentangling situational possibility 
and personal similarity, (c) extending the original defensive 
model to allow for victim as well as perpetrator attributions, and 
(d) enhance the experimental realism that is crucial to arousing 
self-protective motives. Situational possibility, personal 
similarity, and target person served as independent variables.
The experimental conditions were manipulated in the context of a 
cover story designed to elicit subjects' evaluations of a target 
person's communication skills. Two basic vignettes were used and, 
depending on the experimental condition, subjects observed (on 
videotape) a different or similar target person tell how he or she 
was either the perpetrator or victim of a situationally possible 
or situationally not possible accident, satisfying all 
combinations of the three factor experimental design. Following 
the videotaped presentation, subjects were given a series of 
questions designed to examine attributions of responsibility and 
to check the manipulations.
Results did not support Shaver's (1970) model of defensive 
attribution. The critical three-way interaction did not obtain as 
predicted. It was suggested, however, that due, once again, to 
methodological problems, the original defensive model was not 
fairly tested. Manipulations checks revealed that (a) the 
strength of the crucial threat arousing situational possibility 
variable was questionable, and (b) perpetrators were perceived 
more as victims than as perpetrators, manipulation failures that
vi
cast doubt on the rest of the results.
In sum, what seemed like a reasonable way to enhance realism 
and get subjects more involved resulted in yet another 
methodological fiasco. Apparently, subjects do respond to a live 
performance, but the response should be to the stimulus story and 
not just to the person delivering it. Because the critical 
situational possibility was weak, it might be a good idea to 
preselect a sample for whom a particular negative event would be 
especially threatening.
Motivated Distortion:
Effects of Situational and Personal Relevance 




How do individuals decide whom to blame for harmful 
outcomes? Understandably, the business of determining 
responsibility for an instance of misfortune is seldom left 
up to an individual involved in its production. The 
decision instead becomes the task of an observer who, unlike 
the causal agent whose self-protective motives would be 
expected, is presumed to be a "rational" information- 
processor. Whether or not there can be occasions on which 
judgments of responsibility for another's misfortune reflect 
an observer's self-protective motives has, for a long time, 
been an area of controversy between "rational" and 
"motivational" attribution paradigms (Tetlock & Levi, 1982).
Proponents of the "rational" explanation of how 
responsibility judgments are made argue that the perceiver 
is an intuitive scientist (Kelley, 1967) searching for an 
accurate account of events, who sometimes makes inferential 
errors (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1975, 1983; Brewer, 1977; 
Fischhoff, 1976; Miller & Ross, 1975; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). 
Some even go so far as to say that motivated distortion is 
conceptually unlikely (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1983; Brewer, 1977; 
and Ross, 1977). Note, however, that such a claim is 
inconsistent with other well documented social psychological 
phenomena (e.g., cognitive dissonance and equity theories)
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that clearly presume a self-serving (motivated) distortion 
of reality. Why then should attribution processes be any 
different?
The relevant question is: under what conditions would
a perceiver's attributional behavior be influenced by self- 
protective motives? Motivationalists contend that 
attributions are susceptible to motivated distortion when an 
individual (actor or observer) has something personally at 
stake. Hedonic relevance was used by Jones and Davis (1965) 
as a measure of the degree to which an observer perceives 
that some outcome has, for him or her, positive or negative 
consequences. Individuals, be they personally involved in 
some misfortune or a witness to it, are motivated to protect 
themselves against any manner of perceived threat. Whether 
it is perceived threat of potential blame or harm that 
motivates observers to self-servingly distort reality has 
not yet been decided.
So far, attribution theorists have found evidence for 
two self-protective motives that influence a perceiver's 
responsibility judgments. The first of these is a need to 
believe in a just world wherein justice and order prevail 
and all instances of misfortune are somehow deserved. 
Supporters of this view (e.g., Lerner & Matthews, 1967;
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Lerner & Miller, 1978) argue that in order to be reassured 
that suffering does not capriciously befall undeserving 
individuals, perceivers will find victims either 
behaviorally or characterologically at fault. Behavioral 
fault has to do with actions; it is the attribution made to 
a victim who could have foreseen catastrophe but did nothing 
to circumvent it or whose actions directly contributed to 
his or her own victimization. The perceiver reasons that 
the victim's suffering was a direct consequence of his or 
her action (or failure to act), a mistake that the perceiver 
certainly would not make were she or he to be in that same 
situation. Characterological fault, on the other hand, is 
the only self-protective choice when a threatened perceiver 
cannot find fault with the victim's actions. In other 
words, if a victim neither foresees nor contributes in the 
behavioral sense to personal victimization, the threatened 
perceiver cannot be assured that he or she will not likewise 
be a chance victim, and will choose to believe instead that 
the victim was a bad person who got what was deserved.
The second possible motivated distortion of 
responsibility is Shaver's (1970) relevance-dependent model 
of defensive attribution, which deals with attributions made 
to perpetrators. Prerequisite to the "defensive" process is
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situational possibility, such that a perceiver must be able 
to see himself or herself as a potential perpetrator of 
misfortune, the blame for which the perceiver would want to 
avoid. Given situational possibility, where personal 
similarity between perceiver and perpetrator is low, 
attributions of responsibility to that perpetrator will be 
exaggerated. Conversely, to the degree that personal 
similarity is high (and situational possibility remains 
high), responsibility attributions to the perpetrator will 
be minimized and the claim will be instead that the 
misfortune was a result of chance or bad luck. Together, 
situational possibility and personal similarity comprise 
what Shaver (1970) calls "relevance." Whereas situational 
possibility is the necessary (but insufficient) component of 
relevance, personal similarity determines the particular 
direction of the attributional distortion.
It is important to note here that although the two 
motivational hypotheses make different empirical predictions 
they, nonetheless, have at least one critical thing in 
common. Both just world and defensive attribution describe 
how attributions are made for unintentional behavior; 
evidence for motivated distortion necessarily depends on the 
absence of intention. If truly dispositional character
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flaws are demonstrated veridically in intentional behavior 
(Davis & Shaver, 1985), there would be no opportunity for 
perceiver misperceptions. In terms of Heider's (1958) 
levels of responsibility, a victim's behavior, in the just- 
world sense for example, generally does not exceed 
foreseeability, meaning that a rational judgment is affected 
by the extent to which the victim should have known better. 
For a perpetrator, causal participation is undeniable but, 
according to defensive attribution, still does not involve 
intent. Without clear-cut intent then, perceivers are 
required to make judgment calls, and it is doubtful that 
responsibility judgments are always made objectively 
(Shaver, 1985).
Indeed, recent research conducted by Thornton (1984) 
makes a strong case in favor of motivated distortion of some 
kind in the attribution of responsibility. In the first of 
two experiments, Thornton provided subjects with an 
alternative explanation for negative emotion experienced as 
a result of a fellow student's victimization (i.e., 
perceived situational and personal relevance). They were 
told that subjects commonly experience feelings of anxiety 
or apprehension in an experimental setting. Thornton 
hypothesized that if arousal from possible threat (perceived
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relevance) does in fact give rise to motivated distortion, 
then the opportunity to otherwise explain negative affect 
would serve to reduce responsibility attributed to the 
victim. This hypothesis was corroborated. In his second 
experiment, Thornton manipulated private self-awareness in 
an effort to augment subjects' attention to threat arousal 
(again, perceived situational and personal relevance). This 
time no mention was made of anxiety commonly experienced by 
subjects in experimental settings. Perceived situational 
and personal relevance were again manipulated in the context 
of the story of a fellow student's victimization. But with 
no alternative explanation for the negative affect (threat 
arousal) subjects increased attributed responsibility to the 
victim, a finding that, when coupled with the results of 
Thornton's first experiment, produced convergent evidence to 
show motivational influence on attributional behavior. As 
persuasive as Thornton's (1984) research is, however, it 
does not settle all of the important questions.
Specifically, it does not adequately compare the 
attributions made to perpetrators of harm with those made to 
victims, and is therefore a good example of why rationalists 




To recapitulate: the just world theory deals with 
threatened perceivers who make self-protective behavioral 
and characterological attributions to victims in order to be 
reassured that the future is under control; whereas 
defensive attribution deals with threatened perceivers who, 
depending on perceived situational and personal relevance, 
attribute varying degrees of responsibility to perpetrators 
and/or chance. Just world and defensive attribution are 
clearly two conceptually different accounts of influences on 
responsibility judgments for which different predictions are 
required. Regrettably, in the literature, this distinction 
has not always been preserved. Previous studies have not 
been sufficiently careful with the particular manipulations 
that are conceptually called for in either the just world 
(victim innocence) or the defensive attribution 
(perpetrator/perceiver relevance) hypotheses. Nor has 
interpretation of results settled the important issues, 
largely because dependent measures typically ask for either 
perpetrator or victim attributions but not both. Built into 
the present study was a precise treatment of the former, 
while still permitting the latter. Although there is 
evidence to support both the just world and "defensive" 
hypotheses, the present study considered only the latter.
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In a meta-analysis of defensive attribution research, Burger 
(1981) found support for Shaver's (1970) relevance-dependent 
model, but did note that the situational and personal 
elements of relevance (because they are presumed to be 
orthogonal) needed to be manipulated independently. It was 
also pointed out that specific manipulation of personal 
similarity is difficult because it is necessarily confounded 
with situational relevance. A major purpose of the present 
study was to directly and independently manipulate the 
situational possibility and personal similarity variables 
that Shaver (1970) claims are prerequisite to defensive 
behavior and also to disentangle and directly measure the 
two on separate dependent variables.
Despite the evidence, the rationalists insist that none 
so far irrefutably corroborates "defensive" claims, 
criticizing the research on both conceptual and 
methodological grounds (Tetlock & Levi, 1982). That 
conceptual models have been used to make predictions for 
which they were not intended is a major reason why results 
have been confusing. For example, recent work claiming to 
represent defensive attribution (e.g., Janoff-Bulman, 1979; 
Janoff-Bulman, Timko, & Carli, 1985; Karuza & Carey, 1984; 
Tennen, Affleck, & Gershman, 1986), argues that Shaver's
Motivated Distortion
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(1970) manipulation of the relevance variables will 
influence responsibility attributions when the stimulus 
person is a victim rather than a perpetrator. Follow up 
research conducted by Thornton (in press) again looks at the 
influence "relevance" has on responsibility attributed to 
victims -- another misapplication of the "defensive" model 
that serves to perpetuate the confusion. To reiterate: 
Shaver's (1970) original model did not consider attributions 
to victims, so the second major purpose of the present study 
was to make just such a comparison. Consequently, half of 
the subjects evaluated the responsibility of a perpetrator, 
while half evaluated the responsibility of a victim.
The defensive model has also been criticized on 
methodological grounds, undoubtedly the most serious of 
which is lack of experimental realism (Aronson & Carlsmith, 
1968). To begin with, a situation must somehow be involving 
to a perceiver before he or she will relate to its 
consequences. Trivial events tend to be easily dismissed 
(Vidmar & Crinklaw, 1974). For mild outcomes, implications 
for causality, responsibility, and blame are not a big 
concern (Schroeder & Linder, 1976). A severe outcome, 
however, has rather unpleasant implications to a perceiver 
for whom the situation is relevant. Perceived threat,
Motivated Distortion
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sufficient to arouse self-protective motives, is then a 
function of outcome severity only after situational and 
personal relevance have been established (Shaver, 1970).
Likewise, perceived similarity between a perceiver and 
the stimulus person involved in an instance of misfortune, 
enhances realism and facilitates perceiver involvement 
(i.e., the same thing could happen to him or her). A less 
compelling experimental setting simply would not arouse 
threat, and self-protective motives would not be evoked in 
the absence of personal threat. In order to ensure realism, 
the present study utilized the medium of video to present 
vignettes that had been pretested for effectiveness.
Second, in a review of the defensive attribution 
literature, Vidmar and Crinklaw (1974) take issue with 
operationally imposed inferential sets (Jones & Thibaut, 
1958) that they claim confuse empirical findings. For 
example, where experimental demand for accuracy and 
objectivity is overemphasized, subjects cease to be "naive" 
perceivers (Heider, 1958) who seek to find support for value 
maintenance and become instead clinicians who want to 
understand the processes that underlie human behavior or 
trial jurors who evaluate situations relative to societal 
norms. Results of previous studies suggest that subjects
Motivated Distortion
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suppressed normal (naive) responses in the interest of 
objectivity (Shaver, 1970). Subjects, in the present study, 
were encouraged to give "gut level" responses; if demand for 
accuracy and objectivity were eliminated, subjects would be 
free to respond more instinctually.
Still another criticism of the "defensive" research 
comes from Fishbein and Ajzen (1973), who contend that 
ambiguous experimental contexts yield uninterpretable 
results. They argue that when contextual responsibility 
level is not designated and held constant, subjects 
arbitrarily attribute responsibility at different levels. 
Defending the need for situational ambiguity, Shaver (1973) 
states that levels studies and motivated distortion of 
responsibility have different purposes and methods. In 
order to identify which factors motivate an observer to 
misperceive the causal chain of events, situational 
ambiguity is essential. The predicted effect, and therefore 
justification for contextual ambiguity, has been 
demonstrated by Phares and Wilson (1972). By manipulating 
situational information (ambiguous versus structured) and 
outcome severity (severe versus mild), Phares and Wilson 
(1972) found an interaction such that severe outcomes 
produce attenuated responsibility attributions only when the
Motivated Distortion
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connection between stimulus person and outcome is unclear. 
Attributed responsibility is high, on the other hand, where 
connection between the stimulus person and outcome is 
direct, apparently because guilt is obvious. Providing an 
opportunity for subjects to attribute responsibility on 
level-specific dependent measures was a reasonable way to 
both preserve the necessary situational ambiguity and 
control for levels confusion.
The last methodological objection to be raised is that 
of inadequate dependent measures. Responsibility 
attributions have, in the past, been measured 
unidimensionally. That is, subjects typically assign 
responsibility on a single rating scale where endpoints are 
"not at all responsible" and "completely responsible." This 
being the case, subjects have no opportunity to indicate at 
which of Heider's (1958) levels (e.g., association, 
causality, foreseeability, intention, and justification) the 
greatest attributed responsibility occurs (Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1973; Burger, 1981). Precise measurement of attributed 
responsibility requires several unidimensional scales (i.e., 
an independent rating scale for each of the responsibility 
levels), an improvement that would allow researchers to 
calculate "the probability that a relation exists between a
Motivated Distortion
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stimulus person and a certain magnitude of responsibility of 
a certain qualitative type" (Vidmar & Crinklaw, 1974, p.
126). In response to this criticism, the present study 
disentangled the "generic" measure of responsibility by 
allowing subjects to make independent attributions at each 
responsibility level.
It was the overall purpose of this study to select 
variables that would precisely test the defensive 
attribution hypothesis and, at the same time, control for 
confounds that often undermine this effort. Situational 
possibility (high, low), personal similarity (similar, 
different) and stimulus person (perpetrator, victim) served 
as independent variables with outcome severity kept high 
across all conditions. Because Shaver's (1970) defensive 
model presumes an inverse relationship between personal 
similarity and responsiblity attributed to perpetrators, as 
well as between chance and responsibility attributed to 
perpetrators, it was predicted that:
1. Where situational possibility is high, the responsibi lity 
attributed to a similar perpetrator will be minimal and 
chance attributions will be high.
2. Where situational possibility is again high but the 
perpetrator is different, responsibility attributions
Motivated Distortion
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will be exaggerated and personal similarity will be 
denied.
3. Where situational possibility is low there should be 
no differential responsibility attributed to 
perpetrators based on similarity, because insufficient 
threat will not arouse self-protective motives.
4. If this original model is correct, an interaction 
between situational possibility and personal 
similarity will be obtained only when the target 





Subjects were 96 female undergraduates enrolled in 
Introductory Psychology courses at the College of William 
and Mary. Because there is the potential for differential 
responsibility attribution across gender, it was decided to 
use only female subjects. All subjects received credit 
toward fulfillment of a research requirement by taking part 
in the experiment.
Stimulus Materials
The experimental conditions were manipulated in the 
context of a cover story designed to elicit subjects' 
evaluations of communication skills. In order to respond to 
prior criticism of the "paper and pencil" nature of many 
defensive attribution studies, the present research utilized 
videotaped stimulus materials presented in a manner designed 
to be highly involving to subjects. Two basic vignettes 
were used and, depending on the experimental condition, 
subjects observed (on videotape) a different or similar 
target person tell how he or she was either the perpetrator 
or victim of a situationally possible or situationally not 
possible accident, satisfying all combinations of the three 
factor experimental design. For all conditions, precise
Motivated Distortion
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contents of the stimulus stories were determined after 
pretesting. After viewing the videotape, subjects completed 
a number of questions designed to examine attributions of 
responsibility and to check the manipulations. Finally, the 
subjects completed the Just World Scale (Rubin & Peplau, 
1975) intended for use as a covariate in the design, on the 
assumption that individual differences might affect the 
attributions of behavioral and characterological fault to 
victims.
Situational Possibility. Pretesting was done to 
guarantee that the accidents recalled by stimulus persons 
were perceived as either very likely or very unlikely to 
happen to the subjects. Subjects' perceptions of 
situational possibility is crucial to the arousal of self- 
protective motives.
From an initial set of 12 vignettes, pretested subjects 
selected a hunting accident (very unlikely to happen to 
them) and a hospital accident (very likely to happen to 
them). The hunting vignette finds Henry (different) and 
Susan (similar) visiting their grandparents in Michigan's 
Upper Peninsula. Susan has serious reservations about how 
"sporting” deerhunting is, but is persuaded by Henry (her 
brother) to at least come along and enjoy the gorgeous out-
Motivated Distortion
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of-doors. The decision to go hunting that day turned out to 
be a disastrous one for them both; depending on the 
experimental condition (each is alternately perpetrator or 
victim), Susan (or Henry) stumbles, with a gun that is 
loaded but not safety locked, and accidently shoots the 
other. In the hospital vignette, Henry and Susan appear 
either as part-time worker or patient, during a time of 
emergency that calls staff away from their respective posts. 
With no nursing personnel in attendance, a patient, at risk 
for brain damage due to high fever, is unwittingly given 
medication to which he or she is allergic. A near death 
episode turns out to be traumatic for both Henry and Susan.
Personal Similarity. To manipulate personal 
similarity, subjects were presented with a personality 
sketch of an individual who was either very similar to or 
very different from the average William and Mary student. 
Using combinations of several dimensions on which 
individuals are likely to base similarities and differences 
(e.g., gender, age, home region, political orientation, 
aspirations, educational background, general interests, and 
taste in music), pretesting for effectiveness of the 
manipulation was done. Again, the intention was to make the 
stimulus person and subject as similar or different as
Motivated Distortion
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possible. Competence and likeability of the stimulus 
person, however, were held constant.
Based on six pretesting choices, subjects identified 
most strongly with Susan, a 19 year-old "yuppie"- type from 
Northern Virigina, whose goals were an MBA and a husband who 
would support her career pursuits. She liked staying in 
shape, meeting new people, sorority life, movies, 
intercollegiate sports, and the Police. Pretested subjects 
found Henry, a 19 year-old Topanga Canyon liberal, to be 
someone with whom they did not at all identify. He liked 
people, good conversation, the out-of-doors, and being true 
to his convictions. Henry scoffed at Capitalism, marriage, 
exercise, and "preppies." Personality profiles (one to a 
subject) were distributed to subjects at the start of each 
experimental session.
Target Person. Target person type (i.e., perpetrator 
or victim of misfortune) was conveyed via the content of the 
particular vignette. The target person told the story of 
how he or she was either the victim of a hospital (or 
hunting) accident, or the perpetrator of harmdoing to 
another. For the perpetrator manipulation, the absence of 
intent was made evident.
Dependent Measures. The subjects were given a series
Motivated Distortion
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of questions designed to examine attributions of 
responsibility and to check the manipulations. All 
questions were scored as 7-point scales. To enhance the 
cover story, subjects first rated the stimulus person’s 
communication skills by responding to questions like "How 
well did Henry (or Susan) enunciate?," "how appropriate was 
Henry's (or Susan's) speaking tempo?," and "was the degree 
of expressed emotionality appropriate to the content of 
event recalled?" Attributions of responsibility were 
measured on several unidimensional scales. Responsibility 
levels (Heider, 1958), for example, included "how 
foreseeable do you think the accident should have been to 
Henry (or Susan)?," and "to what extent did Henry (or Susan) 
intentionally cause the accident?" The dimensions (Shaver, 
1985) of responsibility included questions like "to what 
extent do you believe that Henry (or Susan) was the direct 
cause as opposed to an indirect contributing cause of his or 
her own misfortune?," and "to what extent do you believe 
that Henry's (or Susan's) actions were coerced as opposed to 
voluntary?" Attributed behavioral and characterological 
fault were indexed and validated (using Cronbach's alpha 
coefficient) for internal consistency (Cronbach, 1951). To 
measure behavioral fault, subjects were asked "how strongly
Motivated Distortion
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do you feel that there were actions that Henry (or Susan) 
could have taken to prevent what happened to him or her?," 
"to what extent do you believe that Henry (or Susan) could 
have done otherwise?," and "how strongly do you feel that 
what happened to Henry (or Susan) was a result of his or her 
own actions?" Characterological fault was measured by 
asking "to what extent can Henry (or Susan) be considered 
responsible for what happened to him or her because of the 
kind of person that he or she is?," "to what degree would 
you say that Henry (or Susan) is a well-adjusted 
individual?," and "how morally accountable do you believe 
Henry (or Susan) was for his or her behavior?" Next, 
perceived probabilities were assessed by asking "how likely 
is it that the accident would have occurred regardless of 
any intervention by Henry (or Susan)?," and "how likely is 
it for the accident to occur given the behavior of Henry (or 
Susan)?" Manipulation checks asked "the likelihood that 
such an accident could happen to you?," to what degree are 
you and Henry (or Susan) similar in terms of beliefs, 
values, and attitudes?," "to what degree is Henry (or Susan) 
intrinsically likeable regardless of how you personally 
relate to him or her?," "to what degree do you believe that 
Henry (or Susan) was the victim of misfortune?," and "to
Motivated Distortion
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what degree do you believe that Henry (or Susan) was the 
perpetrator of harm to another?" Finally, subjects 
completed the 20-item Just World Scale (Rubin & Peplau,
1975).
Procedure
Subjects were recruited for a study of "communication 
skills." Each of the eight videotapes was viewed by a total 
of 12 subjects who were run in groups of four. To be sure 
that subject responses were individual and not a group 
effect, subjects were seated side by side at a long table 
with partitions in between them that extended beyond the 
table. Also, included in the instructions was a caution 
against talking or making any emotional displays in response 
to the materials that would be shown on the screen. 
Videotapes were presented three times each in random order 
to minimize time of day effects. In all cases subjects 
heard the following explanation:
It is generally agreed that self-efficacy is 
contingent on an individual's communication skill.
In order to attain a measure of gratification in 
life, whether it be in the workplace or in personal 
relationships, one must be able to communicate 
personal needs and expectations to involved parties.
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Regrettably, communication skills have not typically
been emphasized. Owing to the current focus on
self-satisfaction, research is being done to 
facilitate effective interpersonal communication. 
Subjects were asked to evaluate the communication 
skills of a target person (Henry or Susan) who, having been 
traumatized (either by perpetrating harm or victimized by 
it) was videotaped while telling his or her story to a 
counselor at a local support group (American Trauma 
society). During the first few debriefing sessions, 
subjects said they knew that Henry and Susan were actors.
The cover story was, therefore, adjusted to include the
following explanation: Because videotaping clients who have
presented themselves for counseling is a violation of 
confidentiality, you will be observing a reinactment of the 
actual storytelling only this time told by actors. It was 
further explained that "observing a videotaped communication 
may seem too laboratory-like, but complex research of this 
sort requires isolation of the various elements of the 
communication process." In an attempt to make the exercise 
subject-relevant, subjects were told that, ultimately, they 
would be asked to summarize communicator strengths and 
shortcomings relative to themselves. All subjects were
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thoroughly debriefed at the conclusion of the experiment, 
and arrangements were made at that time for communicating 




All data were subjected to three different analyses.
The first was a 2 x 2 x 2 (Situational Possibility x 
Personal Similarity x Target Person) between-subjects 
analysis of variance. The second was a 2 x 2 x 2 
(Situational Possibility x Personal Similarity x Target 
Person) between-subjects analysis of covariance, with mean 
scores on the Just World Scale as the covariate. Although 
the covariate was significant on several of the dependent 
measures (i.e., responsibility, blame, chance, personal 
adjustment, intelligence, moral accountability, and 
likelihood that the target person will struggle to get what 
he or she wants in life), significance levels for the 
relevant ANOVA effects did not change, therefore, only the 
significant ANOVA effects will be reported. Third, for all 
pairs of dependent measures, Pearson product-moment 
correlations were computed collapsing across levels of 
situational possibility and personality similarity for 
perpetrators and victims. All measures were scored as 
7-point scales.
Checks on Manipulation
Subjects' perceptions of situational possibility is 
crucial to the arousal of self-protective motives. To
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ensure that subjects perceived an outcome as either very 
likely or very unlikely to happen to them, subjects were 
asked, "What is the likelihood that what happened to Susan 
(or Henry, depending on the condition) could happen to you?" 
Mean scores for this and other manipulation checks are 
presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3, and corroborating pretest 
results, a main effect was found for situational 
possibility, F (1, 85) = 6.97, £ < .01, with the relevant 
situation judged as more likely to happen than the 
nonrelevant situation.
Insert Table 1 about here
It will become important to note that although a 
relative difference across levels of situational possibility 
was found, a mean value of 3.96 (relevant situation) on a 
7-point scale hardly constitutes situational possibility in 
any absolute sense.
Second, to be sure that the target person and subject 
were perceived as either very different from or very similar 
to each other, subjects were asked, "To what degree are you 
and Susan (or Henry) similar in terms of beliefs, values, 
and attitudes?" Again, as was found in pretesting, the data
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in Table 1 show that subjects claimed less similarity to 
Henry (different target person) than to Susan (similar 
target person), F (1, 85) ■= 10.74, p < .01.
Insert Table 2 about here
Because intelligence and likeability have been shown to 
influence perceived similarity, it was necessary to rule out 
differences on those two variables (Lerner & Miller, 1978). 
Subjects were asked, "How intelligent would you estimate 
Henry (or Susan) to be?," and "How much do you think you 
would like Henry (or Susan)?" As was the case in 
pretesting, there were no differences found for either 
intelligence or likeability. Manipulation of personal 
similarity appears to have been successful.
Finally, because Shaver's (1970) original model deals 
with attributions made to perpetrators and because defensive 
attribution research has been criticized for not 
distinguishing between perpetrators and victims, it was 
important that the perpetrator be clearly perceived as such. 
Subjects were asked, "To what degree do you believe Henry 
(or Susan) to be the perpetrator of harm to Susan (or 
Henry)?" and "To what degree do you believe Henry (or Susan)
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to be the victim of the accident?" As Table 1 shows, for 
both measures a main effect was found such that perpetrators 
were perceived less as perpetrators than victims were, F (1, 
85) = 7.51, p < .01.
Insert Table 3 about here
The point to be made here is that perpetrators were 
perceived more as victims than as perpetrators, a 
manipulation failure that casts doubt on the rest of the 
results.
Attributions of Responsibility
A significant two-way interaction was found in response 
to the question, "To what extent do you believe that Henry 
(or Susan) was aware of the consequences that his (or her) 
actions would bring about," F (1, 85) = 7.07, £ < .01, 
suggesting that, for relevant situations, victims were 
thought more aware (means were 2.01, 2.95 for perpetrators 
and victims, respectively), but for nonrelevant situations, 
perpetrators were thought more aware (means were 2.50, 1.74 
for perpetrators and victims, respectively). A two-way 
interaction that, in this case, collapses across the 
critical personal similarity factor, cannot meaningfully
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respond to any of Shaver's (1970) original claims that 
predict specific interactions among all three factors.
An analysis of the simple interaction between 
situational possibility and personal similarity for 
perpetrators only was conducted on all dependent measures 
resulting in a single significant effect. In response to 
the question, "to what degree was Susan's (or Henry's) 
expressed emotionality appropriate to the event being 
recalled?," subjects indicated that a similar perpetrator 
was thought to have expressed either the most appropriate or 
the least appropriate affect depending on the situational 
relevance F (1, 85) = 4.76, p < .05, (means were 4.54, 3.23 
for high and low situational possibility, respectively). 
There were no other significant effects found for the 
critical situational possibility x personal similarity 
interaction for perpetrators.
Although the analysis of variance did reveal three 
significant three-way interactions, none of them deals with 
measures that are central to the defensive attribution 
hypothesis.
Insert Table 4 about here
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First, a significant effect was found when subjects 
were asked to evaluate "To what degree was Henry's (or 
Susan's) expressed emotionality appropriate to the event 
being recalled?," F (1, 85) =4.75, p < .05, such that a 
similar perpetrator in a highly possible situation and a 
different victim in an unlikely situation were judged to 
have expressed the most and least appropriate affect, 
respectively. Second, subjects were asked, "to what extent 
did Henry (or Susan) intentionally cause the accident?," and 
again the analysis revealed a signficant effect indicating 
that, given an unlikely situation, a similar perpetrator was 
thought to have acted the most intentionally, whereas the 
similar victim, not surprisingly, was thought to have acted 
the least intentionally, F (1, 85) = 3.85, p < .05. A final 
three-way interaction was found in response to the question, 
"to what extent would you like to become better acquainted 
with Henry (or Susan)?," F (1, 85) =4.98, p < .05, 
suggesting that subjects were most interested in friendship 
with a similar perpetrator in a situation that has 
implications for their own lives and least interested in 
getting to know a victim with whom they do not identify in a 
situation that is not relevant to themselves.
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Judgments Based on Situational Possibility
Eight questions dealt with attributions of 
responsibility and, as expected, the analysis of variance 
revealed significant differences (main effects) based on 
situational possibility on nearly all of these items. For 
example, compared with subjects in the situationally 
nonrelevant condition, subjects in the situationally 
relevant condition said that the target person was more the 
direct cause, F (1, 85) =9.06, £ < .01, (means were 3.57, 
2.62 for high and low situational possibility, 
respectively); better able to foresee, F (1, 85) = 12.04, p 
< .001, (means were 3.85, 2.70 for high and low, 
respectively); more responsible, F (1, 85) = 9.43, p < .01, 
(means were 3.72, 2.85 for high and low, respectively); and 
better able to prevent, F (1, 85) =4.89, p < .05, (means 
were 5.20, 4.40 for high and low, respectively) the 
accident.
Other main effects for situational possibility that 
were not central to the defensive model, included 
exaggerated attributions to the specific actions, F (1, 85)
= 6.85, p < .01, (means were 4.54, 3.68 for high and low, 
respectively); moral character, F (1, 85) = 5.86, p < .05, 
(means were 3.91, 2.98 for high and low, respectively); and
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personal nature, F (1, 85) = 14.44, £ < .001, (means were 
3.98, 2.60 for high and low, respectively) of the target 
person in the situationally relevant versus the 
situationally nonrelevant condition. Attribution to chance, 
F (1, 85) =4.67, £ < .05, (means were 4.52, 5.23 for high 
and low, respectively) which is central to Shaver's (1970) 
model, was the only measure that did not increase in this 
same direction, such that where situational relevance was 
low, subjects attributed the accident more to chance than 
did subjects in the situationally relevant condition. 
Judgments Based on Personal Similarity
The analysis of variance further revealed significant 
differences based on personal similarity such that subjects 
judged similar target persons as more likely to have been 
coerced, F (1, 85) = 12.75, £ < .001, (means were 2.75, 3.96 
for different and similar target person, respectively); and 
better adjusted, F (1,85) =4.20, £ < .05, (means were 4.27, 
4.86 for different and similar, respectively), both of which 
indicate favorability. This same target person (similar) 
was, at the same time, judged to be more responsible, F (1, 
85) = 9.59, £ < .01, (means were 2.84, 3.67 for different 
and similar, respectively) for the accident, a finding that 
is inconsistent with the more favorable judgments already
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reported. One item, a subjective probability estimate, did 
not follow this same pattern. When asked, "how likely is it 
that the accident would have occurred regardless of any 
action by the target person?," subjects indicated greater 
probability for the different target person, F (1, 85) = 
5.09, £ < .05, (means were 3.96, 3.06 for different and 
similar, respectively).
Judgments Based on Target Person
The last category of significant main effects deals 
with target person differences. Perpetrators were blamed 
more for the accident, F (1, 85) = 4.12, £ < .05, (means 
were 3.66, 2.86 for perpetrator and victim, respectively); 
their actions were perceived as more causally connected to 
the accident, F (1, 85) =21.70, £ < .001, (means were 4.80, 
3.34 for perpetrator and victim, respectively); were of more 
questionable moral character, F (1, 85) = 7.16, £ < .01, 
(means were 3.92, 2.91 for perpetrator and victim, 
respectively); and were held more morally accountable for 
their behavior than were victims, F (1, 85) =5.48, £ < .05, 
(means were 4.16, 3.30 for perpetrator and victim, 
respectively). Paradoxically, subjects had a more positive 
opinion of perpetrators than victims, F (1, 85) =5.27, £ < 





Pearson’s product-moment correlational analysis yielded 
one noteworthy significant relationship, namely a confusing 
positive correlation between perpetrator and victim, r (93)
= .33, p < .01, where an inverse relation was expected. 
According to subjects, the more a target person was 
perceived to be a perpetrator, the more he or she was 
likewise perceived to be a victim. Although it is true that 
an individual can, at once, be both a perpetrator and 
victim, a major purpose of the present study was to 
disentangle the two. This may, however, simply not be 
possible. For example, in both the hospital and hunting 
vignettes, the perpetrator (Henry or Susan depending on the 
condition) was responsible for the accident in an objective - 
causality sense, the punishment for which might be self- 
condemnation. In that sense then, a perpetrator of harm may 
also be perceived as a victim of hers or his own guilt. The 
problem becomes one of knowing how subjects conceptualize 
these subtle distinctions and whether they apply (a) just 
world theory to a perceived victim, (b) defensive 




Based on these data, it is fair to conclude that 
defensive attribution claims were not supported. It is 
important to note, however, that these data do not provide 
unequivocal disconfirmation of the defensive attribution 
hypothesis, because none of the predicted interactions on 
the major dependent variables (responsibility, blame, 
chance, similarity to target person) was significant.
Still, lack of significant interactions between situational 
possibility and personal similarity on the critical 
dependent measures is a very real problem. Do we toss out 
the theory? Or might there have been some methodological 
reason why these results did not support Shaver's (1970) 
predictions?
To answer that question, one might first refer to 
Burger's (1981) meta-analysis of defensive attribution 
research. Certain conclusions drawn by Burger (1981) bear 
repeating in the present context. First, it was concluded 
that research strongly supports the defensive attribution 
hypothesis when observers were personally and situationally 
similar to the accident perpetrator. Second, experiments 
using stronger subject-involving manipulations appeared more 
likely to produce evidence in support of Shaver's (1970)
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model than did experiments with low-involvement 
manipulations. And third, future research should more 
carefully specify whether the target person is a perpetrator 
or victim. Each conclusion will be addressed in turn.
That research strongly supports Shaver's (1970) 
relevance-dependent model of defensive attribution is 
justification enough to continue working toward overcoming 
methodological difficulties that have plagued researchers. 
Apparently, though, the present study was yet another that 
failed to do so. Responding to Burger's (1981) comment 
about the "paper and pencil" (low-involvement) nature of 
many defensive attribution studies, the present research 
showcased target persons on videotape in a manner designed 
to be highly involving to subjects. This particular method 
had not been used before in defensive attribution research.
Target persons were drama students (male and female) 
who, on videotape, told the story of being either the victim 
of an accident or the perpetrator of harmdoing to another 
(depending on the condition, the male or female was either 
the perpetrator or the victim). Based on subject feedback 
during debriefing, it became clear that subjects had 
strongly reacted to the visual images and performances of 
the videotaped actors. The criticisms that were verbalized
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most were all directed at the female target person (Susan) 
whether she was the perpetrator or the victim. For example, 
in the nonrelevant condition, subjects expressed disapproval 
of Susan (the perpetrator) who, had she not been so easily 
persuaded to ignore her own convictions (about deerhunting), 
would not have accidently shot her brother Henry (the 
victim). Where Susan was instead the victim of a hunting 
accident, subjects again believed that by not refusing to 
take part in what she called animal slaughter, Susan 
inadvertently set up her own victimization. Likewise, 
subjects in the relevant condition criticized Susan (the 
perpetrator) for unwittingly dispensing penicillin to an 
allergic patient even though a hospital emergency had called 
away all personnel and the patient could have died without 
antibiotic. Finally, subjects rebuked Susan (the victim) 
who, although intelligent, was not smart enough to make sure 
that no one gave her medication to which she was allergic.
In light of all this, it is easy to see that subjects 
saw Susan the perpetrator (in both the hunting and hospital 
situations) as the victim of unnecessary trauma, and Susan 
the victim (in both the hunting and hospital situations) as 
someone who, by not avoiding victimization, was in a way the 
perpetrator of her own mishap. Hence, conceptions about who
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is a perpetrator versus who is a victim become enmeshed as 
do strategies for judging responsibility for each. It is 
also important to note that subjects said that Susan did not 
"act" as though she had experienced trauma of any kind. The 
salience of a live performance apparently overwhelmed 
subjects who perhaps reacted more to the target person's 
appearance, affect, and bad acting than to the 
manipulations.
To strengthen the case for methodological difficulty as 
opposed to bad theory, one must look also at the 
effectiveness of the relevance manipulations. Yes, 
significant differences were found for situational 
possibility and personal similarity, but only for the latter 
was the mean score just barely on the high side of the 
midpoint. Apparently, subjects did not identify all that 
strongly even with the similar target person. With a mean 
score on the low side of the midpoint, it could hardly be 
said that subjects found the highly possible situation 
relevant enough to arouse the crucial self-protective 
defensive motive. Eyeballing the mean scores for all 
significant effects, what stands out most is their failure, 
in nearly all cases, to exceed a value of four. For 
example, a significant three-way interaction was found for
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degree to which the target person intended to cause the 
accident--but the range of mean scores for all eight 
conditions was from 1.23 to 2.30. Although, relatively- 
speaking, there were significant differences between 
conditions, it cannot be inferred that intent was strong in 
any absolute sense. Even though situational possibility 
(means were 5.10, 2.20 for the hospital and hunting 
situations, respectively) and personal similarity (means 
were 2.00, 5.10 for Henry and Susan, respectively) had been 
pretested (paper and pencil) for effectiveness, these 
results suggest that subjects respond differently to target 
persons on videotape.
Two conclusions can be drawn from these data. First, 
the evidence does not refute Shaver's (1970) defensive 
attribution hypothesis--it was not fairly tested. Second, 
what seemed like a reasonable way to enhance realism and get 
subjects more involved (presenting target persons on 
videotape) resulted in yet another methodological fiasco. 
Future research certainly should continue to work at 
building in experimental realism. Apparently, subjects do 
respond to a live performance, but the response should be to 
the stimulus story and not just to the person delivering it. 
Target persons should, in the future, be pretested to ensure
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that (a) their appearance and demeanor are as neutral as 
possible, and (b) self-presentation (actor) does not elicit 
differential subject response. Because the strength of the 
critical situational possibility manipulation was 
questionable, it might be a good idea to preselect a sample 









Happen To You 3.96 2.81
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Mean Scores on Attributions of Responsibi1ity by Situational 
Possibility, Personal Similarity, and Target Person
Sitpossblty: High Low
Depend Prsnsimilar: Differ Similar Differ Similar
Measures Target Prsn: P V P V P V P V
n: 12 11 13 10 11 10 13 13
Emotionality 3.50 3.64 4.54 4.00 4.18 2.50 3.23 3.77
Intentionality 1.67 2.09 1.54 2.30 2.09 2.00 2.10 1.23
Acquaintance 4.25 4.36 5.00 3.50 4.45 3.30 3.54 3.62
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Susan is a 19 year old college sophomore from Northern 
Virginia. Her high school credentials were excellent, and 
because Susan wanted to compete for a place in the business 
world she was encouraged to select a college with a 
reputation for academic rigor. Although Susan is a self- 
described conservative whose politics and general lifestyle 
lean toward the "traditional," she intends to postpone 
marriage and family until after her career is settled. But, 
she admits that marriage would not be out of the question if 
she meets the right man. Susan is convinced that in a 
cooperative relationship both parties can pursue independent 
careers. Having children, on the other hand, would have to 
be put off for awhile. Rather than going directly into 
graduate school, Susan plans to see how marketable she is 
with an undergraduate business degree. Besides, she doesn't
know in exactly which area of industry she wants to
concentrate, so sampling her "real world" options makes good 
sense. Like most college students, Susan has been known to 
sometimes spend all night finishing an assignment that's 
been put off till the last minute. But, for the most part, 
she is a conscientious worker who is well aware that to 
compete for admission in a good graduate program (if and
when she is ready to make that move) she has got to stay on
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top of her studies. Certainly, the caliber of 
undergraduates at the college where she now attends will 
force her to be sharp and work hard.
In addition to her affiliation with the college 
Republicans, part of Susan's free time is spent planning 
community activities with a local Christian group. Running 
and lifting weights are also part of Susan's weekly regimen. 
Staying in shape and feeling good are important to her, and 
besides, exercising with friends is fun. Susan describes 
herself as outgoing and interested in meeting new people. 
Sorority life and commitments made thereto take up much of 
her time, but the friendship and social benefits make it 
worth her while. Movies, concerts, and intercollegiate 
sports are favorite things to do, with sports events 
generating the least enthusiasm of the three. Her musical 
taste ranges from Springsteen and Prince, to Talking Heads, 
U 2 , and the Police.
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Henry is a 19 year old sophomore from Topanga Canyon, 
California. His high school credentials were excellent, and 
because no one in his family had ever gone to a preppy 
Eastcoast college, he decided to be the first. So far,
Henry doesn't regret having spent the time, he just doesn't 
believe that the real meaning of life has anything whatever 
to do with capitalist money making. He says he'll be 
content to take his degree back to the clean air of Topanga, 
live the good life, and maybe think about graduate school 
sometime down the road. Henry is a self-described liberal 
whose politics and lifestyle tend to focus on community 
welfare. He sees himself as a sojourner in life who just 
takes things as they come. The idea of marriage does not 
appeal to Henry in the least. While Henry likes getting 
respectable grades, he doesn't believe in spending all of 
his time studying. Besides, he's a math wizard who 
apparently doesn't have to kill himself to do well. Because 
graduate school is a possibility for the future, Henry does 
have to stay competitive.
A good deal of Henry's time is spent in the out-of- 
doors. He describes himself as a community person who 
enjoys good conversation with all kinds of people. While 
fraternity life intrigues Henry he doesn't feel that he'd
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quite fit in. Old movies and concerts are favorite things 
to do. Henry cannot figure out why everyone is obsessed 
with exercise and slimness. He is convinced that health is 
a function of putting only essential foods into one's 
system. Henry feels out of place some of the time, but says 
that he's living life according to his convictions.
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This vignette satisfies the following experimental conditions:
(1) low situational possibility x similar person (Susan) 
x perpetrator.
(2) low situational possibility x different person (Henry) 
x victim.
Susan and Henry were spending fall break with their 
grandparents in Northern Michigan. It was deer season, and as 
always Henry was going hunting with their grandfather. When they 
were kids, Susan had gone with her brother and grandfather several 
times. They had even taught her how to use a rifle. As an adult,
though, Susan's attitude toward hunting had changed a lot. She
thought it seemed more like animal slaughter than sport. But her 
brother explained that were it not for hunting to check the deer 
population, they'd eventually starve to death. He even gave her a
refresher course in rifle shooting. It was the second week in
October, and in Michigan's Upper Peninsula the colors were 
awesome. Susan decided to join Henry if for no other reason than 
to experience the gorgeous out-of-doors. Their grandfather 
decided to stay behind--he didn't feel quite up to it this year. 
Henry and Susan drove to a favorite hunting place. They had just 
begun their trek though the woods when Henry gestured for her to 
keep still and hand over his rifle. Susan was suddenly very
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nervous about all of this. She realized that it had been a 
mistake to come. She started to pass the gun to her brother-- 
barrell first--when she stumbled--and in so doing, brushed against 
the trigger. Apparently, Susan had forgotten to check the safety. 
The gun went off, and at point blank range, the bullet shattered 
Henry's thigh. His left leg is paralyzed.
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This vignette satisfies the following experimental conditions:
(1) low situational possibility x different person (Henry) 
x perpetrator.
(2) low situational possibility x similar person (Susan) 
x victim.
Susan and Henry were spending fall break with their 
grandparents in Northern Michigan. It was deer season, and as 
always Henry was going hunting with their grandfather. When they 
were kids, Susan had gone with her brother and grandfather several 
times. They had even taught her how to use a rifle. As an adult,
though, Susan's attitude toward hunting had changed a lot. She
thought it seemed more like animal slaughter than sport. But her 
brother explained that were it not for hunting to check the deer 
population, they’d eventually starve to death. He even gave her a
refresher course in rifle shooting. It was the second week in
October, and in Michigan's Upper Peninsula the colors were 
awesome. Susan decided to join Henry if for no other reason than 
to experience the gorgeous out-of-doors. Their grandfather 
decided to stay behind--he didn't feel quite up to it this year. 
Henry and Susan drove to a favorite hunting place. They had just 
begun their trek though the woods when Henry gestured for her to 
keep still and crouch down. Susan was suddenly very nervous about 
all of this. She realized that it had been a mistake to come.
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Carrying his rifle, Henry stepped up on a log to get a better look 
and in so doing slipped on a patch of moss that was on top of the 
log. Apparently, he had neglected to check the safety. In 
slipping, he brushed against the trigger and the gun fired-- 
shattering Susan's thigh. Her left leg is paralyzed.
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This vignette satisfies the following experimental conditions:
(1) high situational possibility x similar person (Susan) 
x perpetrator.
(2) high situational possibility x different person (Henry) 
x victim.
Susan was a part-time volunteer at the community hospital.
As a business major, she thought the hospital setting would 
provide an excellent opportunity to observe big business from the 
inside. It was also true that the idea of volunteer work appealed 
to her. A patient had just been admitted with an undiagnosed 
infection. Until he could be scheduled for tests, Henry's raging 
fever was being controlled with antibiotics administered every 
four hours. The attending nurse was suddenly called away on an 
emergency. Apparently, there had been a schoolbus crash and 
nurses were needed for triage. In all the commotion, Henry had 
not been attended to--and he was due for his next dose of 
antibiotic. All prescribed antibiotics were clearly marked and 
kept on a tray just inside the nurses' station. Henry had just 
rung for the nurse saying that his head was pounding and he was 
burning up. Susan decided it would be a simple matter to give him 
his medicine. She knew that prolonged high fever could cause 
convulsions and subsequent brain damage. What she didn't know was 
that someone in Admissions had neglected to "flag" Henry's chart
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with a penicillin allergy sticker. Because penicillin is 
routinely the antibiotic of choice for treatment of high fever, 
Susan automatically gave Henry precisely that. Henry went into 
allergic shock. The membranes that line the air pathways 
practically swelled shut--he couldn't breathe. Henry almost died.
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This vignette satisfies the following experimental conditions:
(1) high situational possibility x different person (Henry) 
x perpetrator.
(2) high situational possibility x similar person (Susan) 
x victim.
Henry was a part-time volunteer at the community hospital. 
Given his attitude toward the "capitalist mentality," he saw this 
as an excellent opportunity to scoff at big business from the 
inside. It was also true that the idea of volunteer work appealed 
to Henry's sincere concern for public welfare. A patient had just 
been admitted with an undiagnosed infection. Until she could be 
scheduled for tests, Susan's raging fever was being controlled 
with antibiotics administered every four hours. The attending 
nurse was suddenly called away on an emergency. Apparently, there 
had been a schoolbus crash and nurses were needed for triage. In 
all the commotion, Susan had not been attended to--and she was due 
for her next dose of antibiotic. All prescribed antibiotics were 
clearly marked and kept on a tray just inside the nurses' station. 
Susan had just rung for the nurse saying that her head was 
pounding and she was burning up. Henry decided it would be a 
simple matter to give Susan her medicine. He knew that prolonged 
high fever could cause convulsions and subsequent brain damage. 
What he didn't know was that someone in Admissions had neglected
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to "flag" Susan's chart with a penicillin allergy sticker.
Because penicillin is routinely the antibiotic of choice for 
treatment of high fever, Henry automatically gave Susan precisely 
that. Susan went into allergic shock. The membranes that line 





Hi, my name is Hedy Dexter and I'm doing graduate research in 
psychology. I'm currently working on a project having to do with 
communication skill and its impact on self-efficacy. It is 
generally agreed that self-efficacy is contingent upon an 
individual's communication skill. In order to attain a measure of 
gratification in life, whether it be in the workplace or in 
personal relationships, one must be able to communicate personal 
needs and expectations to involved parties. Regrettably, 
communication skills have not typically been emphasized. Owing to 
the current focus on realization of self-potential, research is 
being done to facilitate effective interpersonal communication.
If you agree to participate all you must do is view a 
videotaped dialogue between two individuals one of whom will be 
recounting the details of some traumatic life event to the other. 
These videotapes had been developed previously in research 
investigating the therapeutic value of client-disclosure for the 
client's own use. may seem too laboratory-like, but complex 
research of this sort requires isolation of the various elements 
of the communication process. Before viewing the videotape, you 
will be given a personality "sketch" of the individual to whom 
your attention should be focused. Afterward, I'll ask you to 
evaluate his or her communication skills the effectiveness of
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which will be measured by how accurately you perceive what goes on 
in the videotaped dialogue. Also, I ’d like you to summarize the 
communicator's strengths and shortcomings relative to yourselves. 
Please do not talk or make any emotional displays in response to 
the materials that will be shown on the screen. The session will 
last no more than 30 minutes. If you'll help me, I need you to 
read this consent form carefully and to sign and date it when you 
have finished. You'll notice that your responses will remain 
anonymous and you may refuse to answer any time you find questions 
that are personally objectionable. Also, if you would like a copy 
of the results when the study is completed, please print your name 
and address on the address labels stapled to the consent form.
(PRESENT CONSENT FORM. WHEN THE SUBJECT HAS FINISHED,
COLLECT CONSENT FORM. TURN ON VHS FOR SUBJECT VIEWING OF THE 
DIALOGUE. PASS OUT QUESTIONNAIRES). It is not necessary to 
ponder each question. Just answer quickly and honestly.
(STIMULUS MATERIALS ARE COLLECTED.) Are there any questions? 
(IF NONE, I'LL CONTINUE.) Was there any aspect of the procedure 
that you found odd, confusing, or disturbing? (IF NO RESPONSE, 
I'LL CONTINUE.) We're a small group here--so feel free to speak 
up. Why do you think I asked you to make attributions of 
causality, responsibility, and blame to the target person? ( )
Why do you think I asked you the likelihood that this particular
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situation could happen to you? ( ) Or how similar you are to
him or her? ( ) Did you feel like I was asking you to make
foolish judgments about unrealistic individuals in an irrelevant 
context, or was there something about the situation or the people 
therein to which you could relate? ( ) Well, some of you have
probably guessed that I've oversimplified my purpose here. My 
study is actually designed to investigate whether or not 
situational possibility and personal similarity influence how 
people make responsibility attributions.
So far, evidence has been found for two self-protective 
motives that influence a perceiver's responsibility judgments. My 
study uses Shaver's model of defensive attribution which deals 
with attributions made to perpetrators of harmdoing to another. 
Prerequisite to the "defensive" process is situational 
possibility, a perceiver's subjective likelihood of being a 
potential perpetrator of misfortune, the blame for which he or she 
would want to avoid. Given situational possibility, the degree of 
perceived personal similarity determines whether responsibility is 
attributed to the perpetrator or bad luck.
I told you instead that I wanted you first to evaluate the 
communication skills of a target person and then summarize his or 
her communication strengths and shortcomings relative to 
yourselves. The reason for this was to encourage maximum
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involvement by making the context highly relevant. It was crucial 
that you take your participation here seriously. Realize, please, 
that while I didn't enjoy misleading you, I sincerely believed 
that it was unavoidable. It's not easy to reveal potentially 
undesirable social judgments. The process by which attributions 
of responsibility are made for outcomes resulting in harm to 
someone are typically resistant to probing. A "cover story," 
therefore, was necessary in order to elicit your honest response. 
I'm always searching for ways to improve research design. As 
subjects, can you suggest how this experimental procedure could be 
more powerful, credible, or pleasant?
Now that you have heard all about the study, we need your 
permission to score your data. If you'd like to give us your 
permission, please sign on the second line at the bottom of the 
form. Thank you again for participating.
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1. How well did Susan enunciate?
Not at all Extremely
well : : : : : : : :  well
2. How suitable was Susan’s speaking tempo?
Not at all Extremely
suitable : : : : : : : :  suitable
To what degree was Susan's expressed emotionality 
appropriate to the event being recalled?
Not at all Extremely
appropriate :___:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____: appropriate
4. To what degree was Susan's communication style
consistent with what you know about her background?
Not at all Extremely
consistent : : : : : : : :  consistent
5. To what extent do you believe that Susan was the direct 
cause as opposed to an indirect contributing cause of her 
own victimization?
Not at all Completely
the cause : : : : : : : :  the cause
6. To What extent do you believe that Susan’s actions were 
coerced as opposed to voluntary?






To what extent do you believe that Susan was aware of the 
consequences that her actions would bring about?




How foreseeable do you think the accident should 
have been to Susan?




9. To what extent did Susan intentionally cause the 
accident?
Not at all Completely
intentional : : : : : : : :  intentional
10. To what extent were Susan's actions justified?
Not at all Completely
justified :___:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____: justified
11. To what extent do you believe Susan was responsible
for the injury that she suffered?
Not at all Completely
responsible :__ :___ :____:____:____ :___:___ : responsible
12. To what extent do you believe Susan was to blame
for the injury that she suffered?






13. How strongly do you feel that what happened to Susan was a 
result of chance?
Not at all Completely
chance : : : : : : : :  chance
14. How strongly do you feel that there were actions that Susan 
could have taken to prevent what happened to her?
Not at all Completely
able to prevent :____:__ :____:___:____:___ : : able to prevent
15. To what extent do you believe that Susan could have done
otherwise?
Not at all Completely
able to :____:__ :____:___:____:___ :____: able to
do otherwise do otherwise
16. How strongly do you feel that what happened to Susan was a 
result of her own actions?
Not at all Completely
her own actions : : : : : : : :  her own actions
17. How much do you think you would like Susan?
Not at all :___ :____:__:____:___ :___ :____: Extremely
18. To what degree is your overall opinion of Susan positive'
Not at all Extremely
positive :___:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ : positive
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19. Do you think that the moral character of Susan in any way 
influenced what happened to her?
Not at all Completely
influenced : : : : : : : :  influenced
20. To what extent can Susan be considered responsible for what 
happened to her because of the kind of person she is?
Not at all Completely
responsible :___:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ : : responsible
21. To what degree would you say Susan is a well-adjusted person?
Not at all Extremely
well-adjusted :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ : : well-adjusted
22. How intelligent would you estimate Susan to be?
Not at all Extremely
intelligent :___:___ :____:____:____ :__:____: intelligent
23. How much would you like working with Susan in an experiment?
Not at all Extremely
like working :___:___ :____:____:____ :__:____: like working
with her with her
24. How morally accountable do you believe Susan was for her 
behavior?






25. How likely is it that the accident would have occurred 
regardless of any action by Susan?
Not at all Completely
likely :___:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____: likely
26. To what extent would you like to become better acquainted 
with Susan?
Not at all :___ :___ :____:___ :___ :___ :____: Extremely
27. How easily would Susan fit in with your friends?
Not at all Completely
fit in : : : : : : :  : fit in
28. From the impression Susan gives, how likely is it that 
what she wants out of life will come very easily?
Not at all Extremely
likely :___:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____: likely
29. How likely is it that Susan will have to struggle for 
what she wants?
Not at all Extremely
likely :___:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ : likely
30. To what degree can you put yourself in Susan's shoes?
Not at all :___:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____: Completely
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31. To what degree do you feel sorry for Susan?
Not at all :___:___ :____:___:_____:___:__ : Completely
32. What is the likelihood that what happened to Susan could 
happen to you?
Not at all Completely
likely :___:___ :____:___:_____ :___:__ : likely
33. To what degree do you believe Susan to be the victim
of the accident?
Not at all Completely
the victim : : : : : : : :  the victim
34. To what degree do you believe Henry to be the perpetrator 
of harm to Susan?
Not at all Completely
the perpetrator :___:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ : the perpetrator
35. To what degree are you and Susan similar in terms of 
beliefs, values, and attitudes?
Not at all Extremely




1. I've found that a person rarely deserves the reputation he has
Completely Completely
disagree :___ :__ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ : agree
2. Basically, the world is a just place.
Completely Completely
disagree :___ :__ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ : agree
3. People who get "lucky breaks" have usually earned their good 
fortune.
Completely Completely
disagree :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____: agree
4. Careful drivers are just as likely to get hurt in traffic 
accidents as careless ones.
Completely Completely
disagree :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ : agree
5. It is a common occurrence for a guilty person to get off 
free in American courts.
Completely Completely
disagree :___:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____: agree








7. Men who keep in shape have little chance of suffering a 
heart attack.
Completely Completely
disagree :___ :___ :___ :____:___ :___ : : agree
The political candidate who sticks up for his principles 
rarely gets elected.
Completely Completely
disagree :___ :___ :____:___ :___ :____:___: agree
It is rare for an innocent man to be wrongly sent to jail
Completely Completely
disagree :___ :___ :____:___ :___ :____:___: agree
10. In professional sports, many fouls and infractions never 
get called by the referee.
Completely Completely
disagree :___:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____: agree
11. By and large, people deserve what they get.
Completely Completely
disagree :___:___ :___ :____:___ :___ :____: agree
12. When parents punish their children, it is almost always 
for good reasons.
Completely Completely
disagree :___:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ : agree
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13. Good deeds often go unnoticed and unrewarded.
Completely Completely
disagree :___:___ :___ :___ :___ :____: : agree
14. Although evil men may hold political power for a while, 
in the general course of history good wins out.
Completely Completely
disagree :___ :___ :___:___ :___ :___ :___ : agree
15. In almost any business or profession, people who do their
job will rise to the top.
Completely Completely
disagree :___ :___ :___:___ :___ :___ :___ : agree
16. American parents tend to overlook the things most to be 
admired in their children.
Completely Completely
disagree :___:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____: agree
17. It is often impossible for a person to receive a fair 
trial in the USA.
Completely Completely
disagree :___:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____: agree








19. Crime doesn't pay.
Completely Completely
disagree :___:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :____: agree
20. Many people suffer through absolutely no fault of their own.
Completely Completely
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